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DAVID J. MALESKI*

Sociobiology and the California
Public Trust Doctrine: The New
Synthesis Applied
INTRODUCTION
We live in a brave new world of 20th century science: a time of
wondrous discovery that sees man probing far out into the universe and
far into the human brain. It is a time of rapid change and dramatic
progress. It is a time of material comfort unsurpassed in human history.
However, in the field of law, the imposed norms of human conduct,
science has been ignored. Science has had almost nothing to do with the
way our laws govern our day to day activities. Our lawmakers, judges,
and legislators seem to believe that the discoveries of science are not
relevant to their task of lawmaking. What little science is brought in for
their consideration is of the "soft" variety, the social sciences of sociology
and psychology. Our world of law is neither new nor brave.
Is there at least some hope for our future? I believe there is. What I
propose to do in this article is to show you how the new "life" science
of sociobiology, a hybrid discipline that brings together knowledge from
ethology, ecology, and genetics, can be used to find the inherited traits
of human nature that influence our daily routines.' Armed with this knowledge, we can look again at our laws from the viewpoint of the sociobiologist. The scientist can teach us what our laws should be, if our
lawmakers will be brave enough to accept them.
Even though its roots go far back into human history, as a discipline
of its own, sociobiology was first proposed in 1975. In that year, Harvard
Professor Edward 0. Wilson, a noted and well-respected zoologist, authored an important book called Sociobiology:The New Synthesis. Wilson
calls his new discipline of sociobiology "the systematic study of the
biological basis of all social behavior." But what does Wilson's new life
science offer to the law? One form of human social behavior we all are
familiar with, the form that is the topic of discussion here, is our adherence
to the rule of law. When we apply sociobiological findings to the process
of lawmaking, we will see the need for changing some of our laws to
*Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University, College of Law, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. Ethology is the naturalistic study of whole patterns of behavior. Ecology is the study of the
relationships of organisms to their environment. Genetics is the study of heredity and variation in
plants and animals, including humans. See E. WILSON, ON HuMAN NATuRE 16 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as NATURE].
2. E. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEw SYNTHESIS (1975) [hereinafter cited as SOCIOBIOLOGY].
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make them more suitable to the way people feel and act. The myth that
human culture is totally flexible is precisely that, a myth. We cannot
continue looking at our legal rules from the misguided view of "cultural
determinism," a myth that tells us that our social institutions are solely
responsible for our behavior.'
Wilson's opinions have not gone unnoticed in academia. As expected,
the cultural determinists have challenged Wilson's concept that there
exists a biological basis for human social behavior. These critics call
sociobiology "elitist, racist, sexist, and a political justification for the
status quo." 4 Sadly, the ardor of their remarks is matched only by the
obvious bias of their political leanings.' Given the passions of the participants in this debate over the merits of sociobiology, and given the
tentative nature of the scientific evidence that supports its claims, this
debate will likely continue for the near future.
But the lack of clear and certain results has not stopped the progress
of modem science before, nor should it now. Twentieth century science
has always been notable for its persistent goal of explaining all phenomena
with a single theory or "paradigm." 6 Professor Wilson embraces this
modem approach of science with his paradigm of sociobiology.7 By means
of the process of "reduction," sociobiology can be used to rethink our
social customs in ways that will help us make them more suitable for

human nature.'
3. One of the founders of the doctrine of "cultural determinism" is Margaret Mead. Mead's
findings, however, have been recently refuted by the Australian anthropologist Derek Freeman. D.
FREEMAN, MARGARET MEAD AND SAMOA: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL

MYTH (1983).
4. Allen, Against Sociobiology, N. Y. REv. BooKs, Nov. 13, 1975, at 182, 184-86.
5. In his own defense, Wilson criticizes some of his detractors as "academic vigilantes." Wilson,
Academic Vigilantism and the PoliticalSignificance of Sociobiology, 26 BIosciENcE 183, 187-90
(March, 1976). In his book, NATURE, supra note 1, at 18, Wilson writes:
It is a misconception among many of the more traditional Marxists, some learing
theorists, and a still surprising proportion of anthropologists and sociologists that social
behavior can be shaped into virtually any form ... Each person is molded by an
interaction of his environment, especially his cultural environment, with the genes that
affect social behavior.
6. A paradigm is a general description of the natural world that scientists view as fundamental
and self evident. For example, the paradigm of biological evolution is the idea that evolution is
guided by natural selection. Thomas S. Kuhn, historian of science, wrote THE STRucTuRE oF
Scmmtc REvOLuTION (1962). This book has been called this century's most influential explanation
of the way science evolves. Through a succession of paradigms, which are in turn replaced with
new paradigms as the old ones no longer fit the evidence, science advances. Paradigms, however,
are absolutely necessary for the operation of coherent scientific research. They are the skeleton that
unites an overwhelming mass of data into a usable body of evidence.
7. Wilson says, "The heart of the scientific method is the reduction of perceived phenomena to
fundamental, testable principles." NATURE, supra note 1, at 11.
8. Wilson warns us that:
Reduction is the traditional instrument of scientific analysis, but it is feared and resented.
If human behavior can be reduced and determined to any considerable degree by the
laws of biology, then mankind might appear to be less than unique and to that extent
dehumanized.... But this perception, which equates the method of reduction with the
philosophy of diminution, is entirely in error.
Id. at 13.
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With that goal in mind, this article seeks to illustrate the impact that
sociobiology may have on the ways judges make law. This article will
explore a rather narrow series of judicial holdings from the California
Supreme Court dealing with a concept known as the public trust doctrine.
By applying sociobiological theories to a single example of judge-made
law, how well our courts manage to oblige or suppress human nature will
be dramatized. Assuming our social behavior is to some degree controlled
by inherited genes, the issue becomes whether the California court even
understands what our biological traits would have us do. The analysis
will begin by briefly reviewing the roots of sociobiology, the biology of
human behavior.
The Theory of Evolution
In 1859, naturalist Charles Darwin introduced his controversial theory
of evolution. 9 In On the Originof Species by Means ofNaturalSelection, ,
Darwin claimed that within every group of living organisms, each member
of that group has different biological traits. Some of these traits are
advantageous to the individual possessing them: they help the individual
to survive and reproduce better than other members. Because this individual's offspring then command a greater percentage of the population
than do descendants of other members, any traits passed on also become
more commonplace. By means of this slow but constant process of individual variety and selection, the species evolves. This process is called
"natural selection." Darwin's paradigm of evolution (that living things
change over a period of time, with the nature of the change being dictated
by natural selection) was his great contribution to modem science. As
with all scientific truths, however, his theory has been refined over the
years to reflect new evidence bearing on this evolutionary processY
Despite these amendments to Darwin's original theory, his basic con2
cept is virtually undisputed by modem science. In s'um, today's theory
9. It was Herbert Spencer, not Darwin, who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest." H. SPACER,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY (1867).

10. Darwin's book is generally thought of as the seminal work on modem evolution, although
Alfred R. Wallace arrived at the same theory around the same time as Darwin. C. DARWiN, ON THE

ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELEcToN (1859).
11. Following Darwin's theory, a group of evolutionists called "Saltationists" theorized that
evolution occurs in jumps, through mutations. Then in the 1930s, the Modem Synthesis, led by J.S.
Huxley, restored Darwin's gradualist approach of evolution. See generally Rensberger, Evolution
Since Darwin, Sci., Apr. 1982.
12. Basic biology textbooks treat the process of evolution, as it applies to living organisms, as
fact. For example, it is stated that:
Mhe Darwinian explanation has been accepted to the point where it is almost universally used to account for evolutionary phenomena. The modem version of Darwinism fits so well into genetics, paleontology, systematics, and other branches of
biology, that it must be regarded as one of the most reliable explanatory systems in
all of science.
E.O. WISON, LIFE: CELLS, ORGANISMS, POPULAnONs 375 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LIF].
The modem theory of evolution has been recently updated by the discovery of DNA, chemical
material living in organisms whose purpose is to pass on its genetic code to offspring.
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of evolution is a combination of ideas all of which focus on the gene's
ability to pass on various traits to future generations. 3 Applying our
modem notions of genetics to the human species, modem evolutionary
theory tells us this: the traits of human nature that were adaptive during
the time the human species evolved (namely, the Ice Age), were spread
by genes throughout the human population.14
Of course, the story of evolution does not end with Darwin's observations about the physiology of animal species. Herbert Spencer, a 19th
century philosopher and author, drew upon principles of evolution to
create his elaborate system of "synthetic" philosophy.' 5 While Darwin
merely investigated the biological nature of evolution, Spencer applied
his evolutionary philosophy to all aspects of human existence, including
culture, politics, and social organizations. Spencer believed that evolutionary processes are always at work; every structure in nature changes
and combines into new forms that are better than the original.
Under the 20th century labels, Spencer would be called an evolutionary
"positivist." His view was based on three essential claims: (1) all knowledge can be explained; (2) natural phenomena, including human situations, apply universally; and (3) science can explain the universal
phenomena. Spencer's views had an important influence on the social
sciences of his time. He supported a laissez-faire approach, permitting
natural selection to bring about change.
Spencer may not have been the first person to suggest that culture is
subject to the process of evolution, 6 but he was probably the most influential. Even today his views are not outdated. For example, the respected economist, Kenneth E. Boulding, has recently written that "it is
not unreasonable to regard human history and development as an extension of the evolutionary process." 7 Boulding accepts as a given that the
"great Darwinian concept of mutation and selection still dominates evolutionary theory,"" even though Darwin's original theory itself has
evolved. Boulding compared the "mutations" of cultural evolution to
13. Through the evolutionary process of natural selection, the genes produce the gross ("phenotypic") characteristics of biological organisms. See Ruse, Sociobiology: A PhilosophicalAnalysis
in THE SocioBioLoGY DEBATE (Caplan ed. 1978). The study of the distribution and transmission of
genes is the "logical base for all of evolutionary thought, for ultimately almost by definition evolution
comes down to changes in gene ratios." Id. at 356-57.
14. See NATuRE, supra note 1, at 32.
15. Spencer's SYNrlurc PHILOsOPHY was presented in a series of nine volumes, published from
1862 to 1893.
16. The argument that biological facts are relevant to ethical theorizing has historical roots that
go back to Axistotle. See Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, in THE BAsIc WoRKS OF ARISTOTLE 9351112 (McKeon ed. 1941).
17. Boulding, Evolution of Riches, 91 Sci. DIG. 34 (June 1983).
18. Id. at 34.
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such things as new ideas, new organizations, new philosophies, new
discoveries, and the like.19
Boulding's views are shared by many others who support the theory
that man and his culture are influenced by his inherent nature. Several
famous ethologists, including Konrad Lorenz, Lionel Tiger, Robin Fox,
and such popularizers as Desmond Morris and Robert Ardrey, share a
common belief that their studies of animal behavior can be extrapolated
to that of humans.2" The contribution that these naturalists and ethologists
make is to show us the universal role of natural selection in shaping all
physical and cultural traits. These advocates argue that "behavior and
social structure, like all other biological phenomena, can be studied as
'organs,' extensions of the genes that exist because of their superior
adaptive value." 2'
Their views do not receive complete approval by either the scientific
or general community. But there is a growing trend to study culture and
society from the view that man is genetically inhibited. Man's range of
possible choices is limited by his biologically inherited nature.' To these
evolutionary biologists the crucial question is 'to what degree is man's
nature made flexible by education and the constraints of law?' And conversely these biologists ask "to what extent should his governments and
institutions be shaped to conform to his instinctive nature?"' For these
biologists, the goal is to join forces with the social sciences in search of
a workable answer to these questions.
19. Boulding's analogy was made to illustrate the problem of different patterns of development
in different societies. He believes that unless there is an "empty niche" for these ideas, organizations,
philosophies, discoveries, etc., to fill, the concept of selection through ecological interaction will
cause these "mutations" to fall. He concludes that any society suppressing anything different from
that existing would be a stagnant society. Id. at 35.
20. See generally, R. ARDREY, AFRICAN GENEsis (1961), THE T"IutrroRiA ImPaRATrvaE (1966),
THE SociAL CoNTRAcr (1970); K. LoRENz, ON AGGRESSION (1966); D. MoRRIs, THE NAKED APE
(1967).
21. SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 21-22.
22. Konrad Lorenz's arguments were used to justify the Nazi's practices of racial genocide during
the 1930s and 1940s. On at least one occasion, Lorenz specifically called for society's intervention
in insuring that mankind would have "healthy stock."
The selection for toughness, heroism, social utility ... must be accomplished by
some human institution if mankind, in default of selective factors, is not to be ruined
by domestication-induced degeneracy. The racial idea as the basis of our state has
already accomplished much in this respect.... We must-and should-rely on the
healthy feelings of our Best and charge them with the selections which determine the
prosperity or the decay of our people.
K. LoRENz, Z. ANGEW. PSYCHO. CHARAKIERKUNDE 59 (1940).
While this scientific theory, like many before it, has potential for enormous abuse, little progress
is to be gained by a "fiat earth" refusal to consider the biological imperatives that regulate our
cultural and social organizations. As Herbert Spencer stated, "The profoundest of all infidelities is
the fear that the truth will be bad." SPENCER, THm PRINCIPLES OF ETHics 125 (1892).
23. LIE,supra note 13, at 485.
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In this same spirit, Harvard zoologist Wilson carries on his pursuit of
a culture-biology connection with his sociobiology discipline.24 The theory he offers is based on the concept that human behavior is in large part
genetically determined.' Wilson says that the ultimate goal of sociobiology is to detect the behavioral traits by which each human being
increases his "Darwinian" fitness through the manipulation of society.26
He claims, in cautious language: "Self-knowledge will reveal the elements of biological human nature-from which modem social life proliferated in all its strange forms. 27
Most of the opposition to Wilson's sociobiology discipline is based on
political, not scientific, evidence. 21 Thus any use of sociobiology to explain human conduct should be limited only by the factual evidence that
may or may not be available. The thesis of this article is that the process
24. A small but growing number of anthropologists and psychologists consider Wilson a seminal
thinker, the catalyst of a paradigm shift that could someday unify the social sciences and the natural
sciences.
25. It is necessary in describing this relationship between culture and biological inheritance to
make a distinction how the process of cultural evolution works from the biological imperatives that
we may bring to the substance of our culture. Wilson says that human social evolution proceeds
along a dual track of cultural and biological inheritance: "Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and very
fast, whereas biological evolution is Darwinian and usually very slow." NATURE supra note I, at
78.
Lamarckian evolution, based on the theory propounded by the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de
Lamarck, says that characteristics acquired (or learned) by an organism in its adaptation to its
environment are passed on to its offspring. Although Lamarckism has been discredited as the basis
of biological evolution, it is the process that describes cultural evolution. Id. at 79.
That the process of cultural evolution differs from biological evolution does not mean that humans
are cultural blank slates. The thesis of modem sociobiology is that cultural evolution must accommodate biological evolution. As Wilson states:
Can the cultural evolution of higher ethical values gain a direction and momentum of
its own and completely replace genetic evolution? I think not. The genes hold culture
on a leash. The leash is very long, but inevitably values will be constrained in accordance with their effects on the human gene pool. The brain is a product of evolution.
Human behavior-like the deepest capacities for emotional response which drive and
guide it-is the circuitous technique by which human genetic material has been and
will be kept intact. Morality has no other demonstrable ultimate function.
Id. at 167.
26. SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 230.
27. Wilson continues: "It will help to distinguish safe from dangerous future courses of action
with greater precision. We can hope to decide more judiciously which of the elements of human
nature to cultivate and which to subvert, which to take open pleasure with and which to handle with
care." NATURE, supra note 1, at 96-97.
28. Wilson characterizes his opposition as follows:
The strongest opposition to the scientific study of human nature has come from a small
number of Marxist biologists and anthropologists who are committed to the view that
human behavior arises from a very few unstructured drives. They believe that nothing
exists in the untrained human mind that cannot be readily channeled to the purposes
of the revolutionary socialist state. When faced with the evidence of greater structure,
their response has been to declare human nature off limits to further scientific investigation.
Id. at 191.
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of evolution has relevance to the process of lawmaking. Our lawmakers
must come to realize that sociobiology has a key role to play in regulating
social behavior. It is time to finally put to rest the argument of the "cultural
determinists" that human behavior is strictly a function of culture.29
29. There is a sizable group of scientists, philosophers, sociologists, and others who believe that
human behavior is determined solely by the influence of culture. One noted advocate of that position,
Marshall Sahlins, argues that man's use of symbols is why we know human behavior is not genetically
determined: "Human society is cultural, unique in virtue of its construction by symbolic means."
M. SAHLiNS, THE USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY 56 (1976).
Other culture enthusiasts have different explanations for the cultural basis of human behavior. For
example, author and Harvard professor Stephen J. Gould argues that the greatly increased brain size
of modem man shows that learning has substituted for genetic control of behavior. Gould would:
"[p]it the concept of biological potentiality, with a brain capable of the full range of human behaviors
and predisposed toward none, against the idea of biological determinism, with specific genes for
specific behavioral traits." Gould, Biological Potential vs. Biological Determinism, 85 NATURAL
HISTORY 12-22 (May 1976).
The thesis of sociobiology is not so simplistic as to suggest there exists a single gene to "control"
specific human behaviors. See Wilson, Academic Vigilantism and the PoliticalSignificance of Sociobiology, supra note 5. In sum, the view of these cultural determinists is that there is an unlimited
flexibility to human social structures. Man is thus free of any biological limitations. Wilson describes
advocates of cultural determinism as having a belief system that "human beings need only decide
on the kind of society they wish, and then find a way to bring it into being." Id. at 183, 187-90.
Whether this cultural determinist view has any merit is debatable. What is certain, however, is that
many cultural determinists believe it is ethically wrong even to consider the possibility of genetically
influenced human behavior. See generally the criticisms of the Sociobiology Study Group of Science
for the People [hereinafter cited as Study Group], in Sociobiology--AnotherBiologicalDeterminism,
26 BIoScmNcE 182, 184-86 (March 1976).
For one particular example of this form of "debate," see the Study Group, id. Discussing sociobiology as a form of biological determinism, they argue that such determinist theories "operate as
powerful forms of legitimation of past and present social institutions such as aggression, competition,
domination of women by men, defense of national territory, individualism, and the appearance of
a status and wealth hierarchy."
Leon Eisenberg, in The "Human" Nature ofHuman Nature, Sci, April 14, 1972, at 124, concerned
himself with the self-fulfilling nature of scientific prophecy: "[w]hat we believe of man affects the
behavior of men, for it determines what each expects of the other." From there Eisenberg argues
that because what we believe about the nature of man has social consequences, those consequences
should be weighed in assessing the beliefs we choose to hold. Id. at 124.
The cultural determinists conclude that evolutionary biology does not have much to contribute to
the solution of social problems. For example, Anthony Quinton argues that the evolutionary process
is a trend, not a law, and is so dependent on unpredictable variables that they only inform us after
the fact. Quinton, Ethics and the Theory of Evolution, BIOLOGY AND PERSONALITY 107-30 (Ramsey
ed. 1966). This view, of coursesays nothing about what we may learn from the eons of evolutionary
development of man, and his current biological nature as it relates to existing social conventions.
What the cultural determinists claim is that those such as Wilson have "served to buttress the
institutions of their society by exonerating them from responsibility for social problems." E. Allen,
Against Sociobiology, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Nov. 13, 1975, at 186. The cultural determinists label
sociobiology a political, not a scientific, theory, and conservative politics at that. Some critics
characterize sociobiology as primarily supporting an Aristotelian, conservation notion of "natural"
political behavior rather than the rival Lockean, liberal formulation. Peter & Somit, Sociobiology
and Politics, in THE SOCIOBIOLoGY DEBATE, supra note 13, at 454.
Even sociobiology's would-be supporters do not all agree among themselves. Wilson finds fault
with some of the contemporary popularizers of evolutionary biology, calling their writings "inefficient
and misleading." The mistake he contends they make is in choosing one plausible hypothesis based
on a review of a small sample of animal species, and "advocating" that explanation to illogical
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Sympathetic reviewers of the new paradigm of sociobiology see it as
a new and dramatic way to understand human society. What follows is
a short outline of how the general process of evolution may be translated
into the process of judicial lawmaking, the evolutionary model.
The Processof Legal Evolution
The evolution of law, or of any other social custom, can be compared
to the general process of evolution. This is because the process of evolutionary change is a universal: it applies to our social customs as well
as to living organisms. The only real dispute is about the nature of that
process of change. Does it follow the Darwinian model of evolution, or
does it follow some other model?
Herbert Spencer's synthetic philosophy followed the so-called Lamarckian model of evolution. Lamarckian evolution says that learned
habits can be passed on to later generations. Although the Lamarckian
model does not fit our modem view of biological evolution, it does seem
to explain much of cultural evolution. So the question is this: how do
these models help us explain the evolution of legal doctrine?
The answer is that it does not matter which model we use to explain
the process of legal evolution. Whichever model we choose, the process
of evolution will involve several specific steps. First, environmental units
(e.g., organisms, ideas, etc.) are mixed and disbursed. Second, there is
interaction and elimination of the worst. Third, the best, most adaptive,
survive. Finally, there is a proliferation of the surviving units. This process
repeats itself, again and again, in a constant attempt to find the unit that
perfectly fits the existing environment.
Drawing an analogy to the evolution of legal doctrine only requires a
change in terms. If we substitute legal holdings for environmental units,
the analogy is complete. First, alternative legal options are suggested, in
excess and variety. In a system of lawmaking, this is done through the
arguments of counsel in court proceedings, through bills in the legislature,
or by way of administrative rulemaking. Second, these alternative legal
options, arguments, bills, rules, are evaluated and gradually sorted out.
Third, we take the options that we think will have the best adaptive fit
within our social environment and put them into use. Finally, if the rule
proves useful, it may lead to like rules in other jurisdictions and comlimits. Unlike the cultural determinists, he still finds value in the various works of such naturalists
as Lorenz, Ardrey, and Morris. By comparing man with other primate species as these naturalists
have done, Wilson believes it might be possible to "identify basic primate traits that lie beneath the
surface and help to determine the configuration of man's higher social behavior." SOCIOBIOLOGY,
supra note 2, at 551. Wilson praises the works of Lorenz, Ardrey, Morris, and others such as Lionel
Tiger and Robin Fox (TIM IMPERIAL ANIMAL) as having a salutary effect in calling attention to man's
status as a biological species adapted to particular environments.
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plementary rules in the same jurisdiction. But because our legal environment is one that must respond to ever changing social conditions, the
same constant sorting and filtering process never ends.
The problem, then, is not with a matter of process; it is whether the
biological imperatives of human nature are included within the substantive
rules that the courts have imposed. This is where the sociobiological
model is needed.
THE SOCIOBIOLOGICAL MODEL
What exactly is the role of sociobiology in understanding the proper
use of law in our society? In the rather narrow scope of this article we
can show how well the California Supreme Court has accepted the biological imperatives of human behavior in the substance of its legal doctrines. Does California's version of the common law public trust theory
illustrate an adaptive or maladaptive fit in present society? And does the
state supreme court successfully respond to the genetically inherited nature
of man? Before these questions are answered, the relevant behavioral
traits that come into play with the legal rules involved must be examined
in more detail. Are these behavioral traits governed by man's biological
impulses, his cultural experiences, or some mix of the two?
The Complementary Function of Cultural and BiologicalEvolution
Margaret Mead's first book, Coming ofAge in Samoa, was one of the
founding documents of the anthropological doctrine of "cultural determinism." Cultural determinism is the optimistic notion that society has
more influence on human behavior and development than does biology.
Although this particular book is no longer considered important except
for its symbolic value,3" the theory of cultural determinism remains the
primary basis for most of this country's political and social policies. But
as the failure of these policies repeatedly points out, it is a theory that
simply does not work.
Now, however, the theory of sociobiology provides us with a whole
new explanation for what makes people act the way they do. According
to Professor Wilson, many broadly defined categories of human behavior
are not strictly cultural inventions. Instead, many social behaviors (such
as male dominance, incest taboos, and other patterns perpetuated by
tradition and cultural practice) are under a degree of genetic control built
into the human brain.3"
30. See Minton, Challenging Margaret Mead, BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZME July 17, 1983, at 9.
The recent book by Australian anthropologist Derek Freeman, supranote 3, at 9, strongly debunks
the nature of the society Mead saw in Samoa. Freeman believes Mead may have been intentionally
misled by the adolescent girls who were her main informants.
31. See Rensberger, On Becoming Human, Sci., Apr. 1983, at 38.
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So what does this mean for us? Professor Wilson believes it means
that it is time to move away from the bias of cultural determinism.3 2 He
says that "although the genes have given away most of their sovereignty,
they maintain a certain amount of influence in at least the behavioral
qualities that underlie variations between cultures." 3 3 Others have been
even more outspoken about the need to turn away from the view that
human behavior is based solely on culture.34
But what exactly does sociobiology propose? Sociobiology does not
claim that culture is irrelevant to the study of human behavior.35 Instead,
sociobiologists attribute to genetics only a control over man's capacity
32. Cultural determinism was itself a reaction to another, more objectionable brand of genetic
determinism. Early in this century many biologists went to extremes in proclaiming that genes
governed not only anatomy but behavior. Their views quickly developed into the eugenics movement,
which sought to "improve" humanity by eliminating genetically "inferior" people. It is important
to recognize that beyond invoking a degree of genetic influence over behavior, Wilson's theories
have little in common with the eugenics movement. See id., at 40.
33. SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 550.
34. Robert Ardrey has painted a colorful metaphor to describe the present value of the sciences
presently dominated by cultural determinist thinking:
[P]icture... cultural anthropology, behaviorist psychology, and environmentalist sociology like three drunk friends leaning against a lamppost in the enchantment of
euphoria, all convinced that they are holding up the eternal light when in truth they
hold up nothing but each other.... All hold to a central assumption that the human
brain owes little or nothing to evolutionary experience .... Masses of hard evidence
are today destroying the essential premise of the three central sciences of human
understanding, that a discontinuity exists between human and other animals.
R. ARDREY, THE SociAL CoNTRAcr, supra note 21, at 22-23, 26.
But would such a movement towards genetics be wise, given the objections of those who claim
sociobiology is merely "genetic determinism?" For example, besides the criticism of the values
implicit in the theory of sociobiology, the methodology used by Wilson in his historic work SOCIOBIOLOGY,
supra note 2, is challenged by the Study Group. See generally 26 BioscIENcE (March 1976). They
argue that there is no direct evidence that human social forms are genetically influenced and, short
of human experimentation, there never will be.
Wilson sees this criticism as the key hurdle in melding biology and the social sciences. Critics
hold a common misconception about sociobiology: they believe sociobiology says human development is "insect-like, confined to a single channel, running from a given set of genes to the
corresponding single predestined pattern of behavior." NATuRE, supranote 1, at 55. We have already
discussed what Wilson believes, and others agree with him. Philosophy Professor Michael Ruse of
the University of Guelph, Ontario, writes that Wilson's chief critics, the Study Group, are misguided.
See generally Ruse, Sociobiology:A PhilosophicalAnalysis, in THE SocioLoGY DEBATE, supra note
13, at 355-75. Ruse says there are at least three ways to confirm the validity of sociobiological
theory: direct evidence, indirect confirmation through predictions, and analogy. Id. at 368. Because
little evidence is currently available by the first two methods, argument by analogy is the only
practical and acceptable method of proving the precepts of sociobiology. Because sociobiology relies
heavily on the methodology of analogy does not mean it has nothing to offer the study of human
behavior, the Study Group notwithstanding.
35. Reviewer Nicholas Wade examined the principal critics of Wilson, the Study Group, and
writes that "the Sociobiology Study Group has systematically distorted Wilson's statements to fit
the position it wished to attack, namely, that human social behavior is wholly or almost wholly
determined by the genes. Such a degree of distortion.., is perhaps surprising from a group composed
largely of professional scholars." Wade, Sociobiology; Troubled Birth for a New Discipline, Sci.,
Mar. 19, 1976, at 1152.
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to develop behavioral traits.36 Even so, if the evolutionary tracks of culture
and biology split too much, humans can be expected to resist.37 The
proper balance between culture and biology must be discovered. If our
political, social, or even legal policies fail to oblige our basic inherited
needs, those policies are clearly maladaptive.3"
Even the most vigorous of sociobiology's advocates admit to some
cultural influence on human behavior.39 But where is this balance to be
struck? How can we know when our social policies sufficiently concede
to the demands of human biology? Here the answers are few. The most
that sociobiology's advocates can tell us is that "the most successful
players of the game of evolution somehow strike a balance between
4
adaptiveness and adaptability.,41
Some suggest that cultural evolution occurs more quickly than our
genetic inheritance can oblige.42 One repeated theme is to portray men
as "naked apes," beings who are maladapted for the complexity of our
hastily built civilization.43 These popularizers want us to tip the balance
boldly towards biology, although they fear the balance may never be
found.
36. Quoting again from Wilson:
The channels of human mental development ... are circuitous and variable. Rather
than specify a single trait, human genes prescribe the capacity to develop a certain
array of traits. In some categories of behavior (i.e., handedness), the array is limited
and the outcome can be altered only by strenuous training, if ever. In others, the array
is vast, and the outcome easily influenced.
NATURE, supra note 1, at 57.
37. LIONEL TRILLING, BEYOND CULTURE: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND LEARNING (1955). Trilling

says "There is a hard, irreducible, stubborn core of biological urgency, and biological necessity,
and biological reason, that culture cannot reach and that reserves the right, which sooner or later it
will exercise, to judge the culture and resist and revise it." Id.
38. In evolutionary biology, any structure, physiological process, or behavioral pattern that makes
an organism more fit to survive and to reproduce in comparison with other members of the same
species is considered adaptive. If the structure or process fails to achieve this, it is maladaptive.
SOCIOBbOLOGY, supranote 2, at 577.
39. Robert Ardrey has written:
The capacity for a human population to form cultural traditions which become a
significant selective force in a particular environment has probably contributed to the
rapid rate of human evolution. To underrate the long-term genetic consequences of a
cultural tradition is as dangerous as to overrate the short-term conclusiveness of cultural
determination.
ARDREY, THE TERRrrORIAL IMPERATrE, supra note 20, at 33.
40. Adaptiveness is the physiological capacity to cope with one's present environment. LiFE,
supra note 12, at 372.

41. Adaptability is the capacity to produce offspring with new combinations of genes, combinations that may be better suited to future environments. Id.
42. Niko Tinbergen, noted sociobiologist, has written that: "because man's limited behavioral
adjustability has been outpaced by the culturally determined changes in his social environment, ...
man is now a misfit in his own society." Tinbergen, On War and Peace in Animals and Man, Sc.,
June 29, 1968, at 1411-18.
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Edward Wilson is less pessimistic about our chances of finding the
right balance. He suggests that genetic evolution and cultural evolution
became locked on to one another about a couple of million years ago.
Each fueled the other and ignited what they call a "Promethean fire" that
drove the evolutionary growth of the human mind at a pace unprecedented
for any other organ. Through a process called "gene-culture coevolution,"
the modem mind and the culture to which it is bound were created.'
Wilson gives us his own optimistic view of the balance to be struck
between genes and culture:
Our primitive old genes will . . . have to carry the load of much
more cultural change in the future. To an extent not yet known, we
trust, we insist, that human nature can adapt to more encompassing
forms of altruism and social justice. Genetic biases can be trespassed,
passions averted or redirected, and ethics altered; and the human
genius for making contracts can continue to be applied to achieve
healthier and freer societies. Yet the mind is not infinitely malleable.
Human sociobiology should be pursued and its findings weighed as
the best means we have of tracing the evolutionary history of the
mind. In the difficult journey ahead, during which our ultimate guide
must be our deepest and, at present, least understood feelings, surely
we cannot afford an ignorance of history.45
To ignore the influence of genes on human nature would be to ignore
the entire science of genetics. With our knowledge of the coevQlutionary
aspects of human behavior, we should be able to link the chains of causal
explanation between biology and our social customs. Admittedly, this
may be contrary to the utopian view that man is free to choose his own
destiny. It still may be possible to manage our conflicting biological traits.
But if our social policies ignore the bounds of our biological drives, this
would indeed be foolhardy and, ultimately, unproductive.
Wilson's theory of coevolution argues that human social behavior came
about as a result of a special evolutionary process.46 In this special process,
genetic evolution, specifically that affecting the brain, is yoked in a
feedback loop with cultural evolution.47 Once again, he has supporters
in this interpretation, one of whom describes a similar version of a coe43. LwE, supra note 12, at 484.
44. See generally, E. WILSON & C. LUMSDEN, PROMErHEAN Fin (1983).
45. See Wilson, Human Decency is Animal, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Oct. 12, 1975 at 1411-18.
46. E. WILsON, GENEs, MIND, AND CULTURE (1981).
47. One mechanism which could account for the vast time differences between cultural and
biological evolution is the "multiplier effect." Wilson described this term as follows: "The amplification of the effects of evolutionary change in behavior when the behavior is incorporated into the
mechanisms of social organization." SocIoBIoLoGY, supra note 2, at 589. In other words, small
evolutionary changes in the behavior patterns of a few individuals could be amplified into a major
social effect.
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volutionary theory of human evolution48 by saying that during the biological evolution of human beings, one of the traits selected for was "an
unusual capability for modifying and extending phenotypes on the basis
of learning and experience." 49
Man's potential to adapt culturally, as well as genetically, is itself a
genetic trait. Cultural adaptability improves human survival and reproduction ability, and is thus a trait that is naturally selected. The important
conclusion is that selfish, individual gene characteristics usually win out
over traits that would only benefit the group.5 0
Applying a coevolutionary balancing of genetics and culture, we can
consider what specific value sociobiology has for reforming our social
customs. What are the goals of sociobiological analogy; can it really do
more than vaguely remind us of our biological heritage? Once again, we
can turn to Professor Wilson who writes that: "a society that chooses to
ignore the existence of the innate epigenetic rules will nevertheless continue to navigate by them and at each moment of decision yield to their
dictates by default." 5" So our goal is relatively simple, albeit unpleasant
for those who cling to the notion of total free will. Our goal is to understand and apply the limits that biology imposes on human nature.
We need not mourn the death of free will. There are those who maintain
that adherence to the "epigenetic rules" will pull us through, guide us
to a stable and more benevolent world. But if we blithely wander down
the dead-end route of cultural determinism, we will continue to be governed by mysterious genetic forces that we refuse to study and understand.
No matter how slender these biological connections may at first appear,
we must look further for whatever clues we can find. We need to find
48. Durham, Toward a CoevolutionaryTheory of Human Biology and Culture, in THE SociOBIOLoGY
DEaArE, supra note 13, at 428-48.

49. Id. at 428. "Phenotypes" are the observable properties of an organism as they have developed
under the combined influence of the genetic constitution of the individual and the effects of environmental factors. SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 591.
50. Durham, supranote 50, at 440, proposed "that processes of cultural selection operating within
and between human social groups generally result in the selective retention of cultural traits, including
behaviors, that past experience and some degree of prediction suggest to be most advantageous to
the inclusive fitnesses of individual members." He summarizes his views of biological and cultural
coevolution as follows:
Because the capacity for culture allows human beings to modify aspects of phenotype
without any concomitant genotypic change, I have argued that it makes no sense to
view the evolution of human attributes, including social behavior, solely in terms of
the natural selection models of sociobiology. Instead, I have suggested that a process
of "cultural selection" functionally complements natural selection by retaining in time
those cultural variants whose net effect best enhances the inclusive fitnesses of individuals. Where cultural selection operates in this way, human phenotypes would then
evolve subject to both biological and cultural influences in the direction of character
states that maximize inclusive fitness under prevailing environmental conditions.
Id. at 444.
51. E. WILSON & C. LuMSDEN, supra note 44.
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the proper balance between the limits of our biological potential and the
challenges of our utopian social goals.52
So of what use can the broad projections of sociobiology be to the
mundane and highly specific concerns of law? Sociobiology is relevant
only if we view the law as society's mandated system of ethics. By seeing
sociobiology as a form of biological "ethics," we can gain new insights
into what is ethical and appropriate behavior. Moral beliefs are merely
the "emotive expressions of basic biological states." Moral claims come
from the emotive centers of the hypothalamic-limbic systems, a system
that has evolved from natural selection. This means many human drives
are "ineradicable and innately determined." Humans must be granted
certain inalienable rights not because of some constitution or charter, but
because our biological inheritance requires them.53
An even more extreme view of biological ethics holds the ideal purpose
of law is to forbid men to do only what the "artificial conditions of
52. In PROmETEAN FIRE, Wilson expressed his view of the goals of sociobiology:
[T]he deep scientific study of the epigenetic rules will call the (ancient hereditary)
oracle to account and translate its commands into a precise language that can be
understood and debated. People who know human nature in this way are more likely
to agree on universal goals within the constraints of that nature and recognize absolute
ethical truths, if such can be shown to exist. And although societies cannot escape the
inborn rules of epigenesis and would lose the very essence of humanness if they even
came close to succeeding, they can employ knowledge of the rules to guide individual
behavior and cultural evolution to the ends on which their members may someday
agree...
WiLsoN & LuMSDEN, supra note 44.
53. Wilson concludes that we should have:
[A] sense of reserve about proposals for radical social change based on utopian institutions. To the extent that the biological interpretation ... proves correct, man has
rights that are innate, rooted in the ineradicable drives for survival and self-esteem,
and these rights do not require the validation of ad hoc theoretical constructions
produced by society. If culture is all that created human rights, as the extreme environmentalist position holds, then culture can equally well validate their removal.
Wilson, 26 BIOSCENCE 189 (March 1976).
Philosopher Noam Chomsky has noted the potential for dictatorship found in the cultural determinist position:
One can easily see why reformers and revolutionaries should become radical environmentalists, and there is no doubt that concepts of immutable human nature can be and
have been employed to erect barriers against social change and to defend established
privilege. But a deeper look will show that the concept of the "empty organism,"
plastic and unstructured, apart from being false, also serves naturally as the support
for the most reactionary social doctrines. If people are, in fact, malleable and plastic
beings with no essential psychological nature, then why should they not be controlled
and coerced by those who claim authority, special knowledge, and a unique insight
into what is best for those less enlightened? . . . The principle that human nature, in
its psychological aspects, is nothing more than a product of history and given social
relations removes all barriers to coercion and manipulation by the powerful. This too,
I think, may be a reason for its appeal to intellectual ideologists, of whatever political
persuasion.
N. CHoMSKY, REFLECrIONS ON LANGUAGE 132 (1975).
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civilization would drive them to do." Law would serve mainly as a
balancing device. It would counteract the distortions of modem society.
It would help to preserve, under our unnatural conditions of civilization,
those forms of social conduct natural to humans.54
Now we can see the coevolutionary goal of sociobiology: the balancing
of culture and biology. We need only to identify what human biological
traits might apply to something as narrow and specific as the public trust
doctrine. It is impossible at this time to be sure of what traits to include.
Two distinct and competing biological characteristics of humans, territoriality and altruism, however, are very promising candidates.
Territoriality
People have an innate drive to possess territory. Sociobiology defines
a territory as an area occupied, more or less exclusively, by an animal
or group of animals by means of repulsion through overt defense or
advertisement. 5 Robert Ardrey draws an analogy between animal and
human protection of territory;56 he believes that what he calls man's
"territorial imperative" is an aspect of human behavior that, while shaped
by environment, is a result of evolutionary inheritance and not human
choice.57
The reason that man will defend title to his land is no different, no
less innate, and no less ineradicable than the reason lower forms of animal
species do the same.5 8 But there is an important caveat to man's inherited
sense of territory. Human territorial behavior patterns are "open" programs of instinct. While the human trait to possess and defend a territory
is innate, the limitations on the size of ownership interest can be learned.59
Man's territorial nature is genetically inherent; showing dignity to his
humanness requires showing dignity to him as a landholder.' Man's
possession of a defined territory can satisfy built-in needs for identity,
stimulation, and security better than most cultural traditions. 6' Drawing
54. See D. MoRRIs, THE HuMAN Zoo 26 (1969).
55. SocIoBmoOoy, supra note 2, at 597.

56. ARDR Y, THE TERRrromrAL IMPERATEVE, supra note 20, at 5.
57. Id. at ix.
58. Id.at 5.

59. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 15. As Ardrey explains:
We have seen enough of such phenomena as homing, the pair territory, and the behavior
of the arena to grasp the basic territorial principle in its adjustment of the individual
to the demands of the population and the species: what I have described as the innate
enforcement of a biological morality. Now, if we are to approach a general application
of the territorial principle to the condition of man, we must come also to understand
the ways in which territory may be related to the formation and perpetuation of society
itself.
61. Id. at 335.
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analogies from the animal world, territorial societies are the most egalitarian, least dominant, most peaceful, stable, and cooperative societies
that exist. And all the while they sacrifice a minimum of personal freedom.6'
There is a problem for modem day man. The growth of cities and
overpopulation are a serious threat to man's innate welfare. Very few
things can strain the "social contract" 63 as much as the urban challenge.
Because of the crush of our overpopulated cities, space can be "recaptured
only by the romanticism which regards the summer cottage, occupied
four weeks a year. " Territory is an important, natural arrangement. The
possession of a defined "space" acts as the supreme peacemaker. Our
ability to retreat to a personal space is our way of reducing the occasions
we have for violent behavior.65
Others agree that we have a built-in human need to possess territory,
but at the same time they stress our inherent ability to put the concerns
of a group before our own selfish territorial needs. These naturalists and
ethologists say the human trait of putting the interests of one's group
before one's own is itself a genetically inherited trait. "Intergroup selection" eventually permits the natural selection of one entire local population over another.66 "Territory" is one effective way that group instincts
may be put before the individual's. By barring strangers in defense of
group territory, the total population in an area is limited. Overpopulation
is prevented; the carrying capacity of the habitat is held at a stable level;
and the group survives.67
Territoriality can be viewed as merely one form of the instinct of
aggression, one of the kinds of aggressive behavior that can be directly
tested by the new discipline of sociobiology. 6' Territorial defense is a
62. Id. at 223.
63. ARDREY, THE SociAL CoNTRAcr, supra note 20, at 276.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 294. Answering the claims of the cultural determinists that choice can effectively control
human behavior, Ardrey replies:
If man is infinitely malleable, as so many would have us believe, then urban concentration should offer no dismay. We can adapt to anything, even to the crawling masses
of insect life. It is a proposition that few would accept. The territorial principle has
been evolution's most effective implement in the distribution of animal space. And if
man is a being biologically equipped with territorial patterns, then at least we have a
premise to work from. Urbanization is deterritorialization in the classic sense of denial
of land. But perhaps there may be conceptual substitutes or symbolic channels that
will preserve our biological sanity. We may be sure, however, that we must somehow
preserve NO TRESPASSING signs.
Id. at 256-57.
66. Wynne-Edwards, Intergroup Selection in the Evolution of Social Systems, 200 NATURE 623
(1963).
67. See generally id. at 623-26.

68. Wilson says that "like so many forms of behavior and instinct, aggression in any given species
is actually an ill-defined array of different responses with separate controls in the nervous system."
NATURE, supra note 1, at 101. Wilson goes on to explain that no fewer than seven categories can
be distinguished; among them are the defense and conquest of territory. Id. at 101-07.
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"buffering device" against long-term overpopulation of the environment.
By providing a self-policing restraint, this drive to protect territory keeps
the population from either "exploding or crashing. "69
Insofar as humans are concerned, the study of territorial needs is in a
very early stage. We know that bands of hunter-gatherers around the
world are often aggressive in their defense of land containing reliable
food sources.70 We know that territorial behavior in animal species occurs
only when some vital resource can be economically defended. 7 1 But it is
only very recently that anthropologists have begun to analyze the examples of human defense of territory with the biology of human behavior
in mind.72
The "biological formula of territorialism translates easily into the rituals
of modern property ownership." 73 Property ownership is merely a trait
of the mammalian species. Every culture develops its own unique rules,
laws, and customs to safeguard personal space.74 The defense of property
has a biologically inherited mandate, a territorial imperative.

69. See generally id. at 107-10.
70. Wilson related the stories of the Ona of Tierra del Fuego, and the Washo Indians of the Great
Basin, who would attack those bands that would trespass on "their" lands, fish "their" lakes, or
hunt "their" deer. Id. at 108. Other similar conduct involved the Nyae Nyae Bushmen, and the
Walbiri of the Australian desert.
71. By "economically defensible," Wilson means the energy saved and the increase in survival
and reproduction due to territorial defense outweighs the energy expended and the risk of injury and
death resulting from the defensive efforts. Id. at 107.
72. See Dyson-Hudson & Smith, Human Territoriality:An EcologicalAssessment, in EVOLtrIONARY
BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (Chagnon & Irons eds. 1978). The authors note that
areas defended by hunter-gatherers are precisely those that appear to be the most economically
defensible, and when food resources are scattered in space and unpredictable in time, bands do not
defend their home ranges; in fact, they often share occasional discoveries of rich food sources. Id.
73. NATuRE, supra note 1, at 109.
74. Pierre van den Berghe, a sociologist, has provided the following description of present-day
behavior around vacation residences near Seattle, Washington:
Before entering familial territory, guests and visitors, especially if they are unexpected,
regularly go through a ritual of identification, attention drawing, greeting, and apology
for the possible disturbance. This behavioral exchange takes place outdoors if the
owner is first encountered there, and is preferably directed at adults. Children of the
owners, if encountered first, are asked about the whereabouts of their parents. When
no adult owners are met outdoors, the visitor typically goes to the dwelling door,
where he makes an identifying noise, either by knocking on the door or ringing a bell
if the door is closed, or by voice if the door is open. The threshold is typically crossed
only on recognition and invitation by the owner. Even then, the guest feels free to
enter only the sitting room, and usually makes additional requests to enter other parts
of the house, such as a bathroom or bedroom.... The dirt road through the development is freely accessible to all members of the club who use it both to gain access
to their lots and to take walks. Etiquette calls for owners to greet each other when
seeing each other outdoors, but owners do not feel free to enter each other's lots
without some ritual of recognition. This ritual is, however, less formal and elborate
when entering lots outdoors than when entering houses.
van den Berghe, TerritorialBehaviorin a NaturalHumanGroup, in 16 SociAL ScIENCES INFORMATION
419-30 (1977).
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Altruism
The defense of territory does not alone define man's genetic behavior.
Human beings possess many genetically inherited traits. The central "theoretical problem" of proving sociobiology is in showing how "altruism,
which by definition reduces personal fitness, [can] possibly evolve by
natural selection."'"
Natural selection is essentially a selfish, self-directed process. How
does the theory of evolution then explain unselfish, other-directed behavior? The answer is "kinship." If the genes containing the human
tendency for altruistic behavior are shared by two organisms because of
their common descent, and if the altruistic death of one organism to save
the other multiplies the total representation of these genes in the next
generation, the trait of altruism will spread throughout the gene pool.76
An evolutionary process called "reciprocal altruism"" adds to this view
of genetic altruistic behavior. Extrapolating from a mathematical model,"
it can be shown how altruistic behavior can be selected even without
close kinship to the beneficiary.
Suppose we have a drowning man, Vince Victim, and his unrelated,
would-be rescuer, Ralph Rescuer. If Ralph Rescuer bravely jumps into
the water to save Vince Victim, creating risk for himself in the process,
most of us would say this is a purely altruistic (and heroic) act. But
examining this situation from the theory of reciprocal altruism, we see
that good samaritan Ralph really has much to gain personally from his
heroic act. If the risks involved are less than the possible reciprocal
benefits coming from Vince in the future, the altruism of Ralph will
actually enhance his genetic fitness.7 9 His ability to survive and reproduce
75. SocioBIoLOGY, supra note 2, at 3.
76. Id. at 3-4. A "gene" pool is simply all the genes-hereditary material-in a population. Id.
at 585. Thought of in these terms, Wilson says that when "altruism is thought of as a mechanism
by which DNA multiplies itself through a network of relatives, spirituality becomes just one more
Darwinian enabling device." Id. at 120.
77. See Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprocalAltruism, 45 Q. REv. BIoLoGy 35-39, 45-47 (March
1971).
78. See Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEOlfTicAL BIoLoGY 1 (1964).
Hamilton's model explained the concept of "inclusive fitness." This concept states that an individual's
genetic fitness is to be measured not only by the survival and reproduction of himself and his
offspring, but also by the enhancement of the fitness of other more distant relatives who share his
genes. Hamilton's model is a key concept in Wilson's book, SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 37982. Wilson believes that vertebrates, including human societies, consist of selfish subgroups of
closely related kin, competing with other kin groups at the expense of the integrity of the society
as a whole. But because of man's greater intelligence, a high degree of cooperativeness can offset
to some degree these characteristics. See generally, Sade, The Evolution of Sociality, Sci., Oct. 17,
1975, at 261-63.
79. Trivers' model can be described as follows: suppose that the drowning man (Vince) has a
one-half chance of drowning if he is not assisted, whereas the rescuer (Ralph) has a one-in-twenty
chance of dying. Imagine further that when the rescuer drowns the victim also drowns. But when
the rescuer lives, the victim is always saved. If such episodes were extremely rare, the Darwinist
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is increased. Human reciprocal altruism takes place in a number of different contexts. But no matter the context, when we probe the underlying
reason for the conduct, we find the same scenario of a relatively small
cost to the provider and a great benefit to the recipient.8
So, to some sociobiologists, altruism is one of the inherited traits of

human behavior. But how does altruism interact with a contrary biological
trait, such as territoriality? One answer is that man evolved as a tribal
animal, and the basic nature of a tribe is to operate on a local and personal
basis.8 ' When early groups of humans faced a hostile environment, such
traits as compassion, kindness, mutual assistance, and the basic need to
cooperate became the natural patterns of human behavior. As these tribes
grew into impersonal "super-tribes," those ancient patterns of conduct
began to break down. Only then were artificial laws and codes of discipline
needed to correct the imbalances created by cultural pressures.8 2
So what does this mean for man's altruistic nature? It means that as a
biologically inherited trait, our choice would be to sacrifice ourselves
only for the "ingroup" and to exclude the "outgroup." But the dividing
line between the "ins" and the "outs" can be changed by culture, by our

learned behavior.8 3

Along with the flexibility to adapt culturally, certain genetic safeguards
have been built into man's genetic nature to curb abuses of personal
freedom that threaten the safety of the group.' These safeguards are ways
calculus would predict little or no gain to the fitness of the rescuer for his attempt. But if the drowning
man reciprocates at a future time, and the risks of drowning stay the same, it will have benefitted
both individuals to have played the role of rescuer. Each man will have traded a one-half chance of
dying for about a one-tenth chance. A population at large that enters into a series of such moral
obligations, reciprocally altruistic acts, will be a population of individuals with generally increased
genetic fitness. The tradeoff actually enhances personal fitness. See Trivers, supra note 77, at 36;
SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at 120.
80. As mentioned supra, many would argue that it is improper to compare animal and human
altruism. For example, Ruth Mattern, reviewing Wilson's work in SOCIOBIOLOGY, criticizes the
assumption that altruistic behavior of the same type is found in both animals and humans. She says
they are not the same because human altruism occurs when acts are done with the intention and
primary motive of benefitting others. Mattem claims no similar mental element is present in animal
altruism. The fallacy of this distinction is to assume that human rationalizations like intention and
motive supercede the basic genetic instinct of altruistic behavior, and make it any more a matter of
free will than the type of behavior that has altruistic consequences without these human rationalizations. Mattem, Altruism, Ethics, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIoLoGy DEBATE 462-75 (1978).
Robert Ardrey recognizes no distinction, no "qualitative break between the moral nature of the
animal and the moral nature of man." . .. [e]volution has been ready to equip the animal with
innate behavioral commands restraining the interests of the individual on behalf of larger or more
immortal goals as it has been ready so to equip the human species." ARDREY, THE TERRiTORIAL
IMPERATIVE, supra note 20, at 78.
81. MoRms, supra note 54, at 17-18.
82. Id. at 24-25.
83. See NATuRE, supra note 1, at 163. We need only observe professional sports to see the
durability of this basic, Ice Age phenomenon of shifting loyalties.
84. See Wynne-Edwards, Ecology and the Evolution of Social Ethics, in BIOLOGY AND THE HUMAN
SciENcEs 61-69 (Pringle ed. 1972).
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to counteract our tribal nature. They insure that our loyalties are directed
towards the larger group. Examples of these safeguards are social customs, religion, moral principles, and other, established codes of conduct.
What we call conscience is in truth an inbred, emotional and genetically
inherited human trait. It is tied to the protection, defense, and allegiance
of the group. To the extent that this innate consciousness is ignored, no
system of codified laws can ever hope to compel behavior.8 5
The size of the group to which our loyalties will be given can grow
when the welfare of a larger group is threatened. There are limits, however, to our expanding sense of loyalty. These limits are due partially to
the varieties among cultures but, more significantly, due also to the finite
biological capacity humans have to give loyalty to those viewed as being
strangers.8 6
This tendency to reject strangers has been labelled "animal xenophobia."8 7 In the animal and human world, this fear of strangers is needed
to insure order in the group. A fixed number of familiars in a group helps
us to learn who our neighbors are. Introducing strangers into our group
threatens its stability. If strangers are permitted at all, we will condemn
them to the bottom of the social rank where their potential for social
disruption will be at a minimum. Through this process, our xenophobia
guarantees the safety of our group, with the least possible chance of its
disruption. 8
The limited scope of human altruism finds an outlet in the number of
ways we isolate our sub-tribes from the super-tribe. For example, we
tend to think of language solely as a communication device, but looking
back through tribal history, the exclusionary use of language has been
almost as important as its communication function. Language is used as
a barrier to identify one as a member of a rival super-tribe. Language
barriers89 put obstacles in the way of one wishing to defect to another
group.
From our knowledge of the limited scope of altruistic behavior, we
have learned that if the impact of a legal rule requires the protection of
85. Wynne-Edwards concludes that there is a formidable and conflicting hierarchy of social
groupings that are effective at different levels, ranging at the bottom from that of a few individuals
temporarily banded together for a mutual end, right up to the human species as a single whole. He
asks:
Are there any criteria that a biologist can give, by which the individual can be guided
in dividing his loyalties? From the biological point of view, his overriding duty should
be to ensure the survival of the stock to which he belongs and whose torch he temporarily bears. This is the primary purpose towards which his moral or altruistic
behavior ought therefore to be directed.

Id. at 68.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See generally id. at 61-69.
ARDPY,Tim SociAL CoNTRAcr, supra note 20, at 265.
Id. at 266.
See MoRRIs, supra note 54, at 29-30.
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those not in our perceived group, those rules will not be in accord with
the biological forces that govern our species. Fortunately, man's great
cultural flexibility makes it possible to expand the size of the group. This
expansion, however, will depend upon the seriousness of the threat to
the larger group. If the threat is not seen as truly serious, we will not be
able to dictate altruistic behavior with any kind of social or legal norm.
We will find a way to change that maladaptive norm, or a way to ignore
it.
We are now ready to look at the specific example of legal doctrine that
is the subject of our sociobiological inquiry. In the state of California,
creation of a public trust theory has come about mainly by the process
of judge-made common law. The current majority of the California Supreme Court is solidly in favor of changing the way that California's
shorezone property owners use their lands. This desire is clear from their
recent holdings. But are these holdings justified? We may use the paradigm
of sociobiology to see whether the California Supreme Court has created
a doctrine that will meet the biological imperatives of human nature.
THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine is a common law theory that over the last
few years has become quite important for advocates of natural resource
protection.' The theory pits two basic human concerns against one another: the defense of private property uses against the preservation of
those resources for public use. Because of the competing nature of these
two concerns and because they bear a remarkable similarity to the human
instincts of territoriality and altruism, the study of the recent evolution
of the public trust doctrine can be helpful. By noting how the balance
between private land use and preservation of land has been changed by
the California Supreme Court, something may be discovered about the
importance of human nature in deciding legal disputes.
As a legal theory, the public trust doctrine was well-known to ancient
Rome.91 The Roman version of the doctrine held that the public owns
the right to tidelands for such uses as commerce, navigation, and fishing.
Roman law said the public's right to these lands were "illimitable and
unrestrainable"; these rights were not available for sole and exclusive
appropriation." A similar theory can be traced back to early England's
90. Although the concept of the public trust is a rather ancient one, interest was renewed in this
theory in recent years by the efforts of several scholars, most notably Professor Joseph Sax in an

influential book,

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT

(1970). Sax makes a persuasive argument for the

use of the public trust doctrine as a means of environmental protection and improvement. See
generally, Symposium: Public Trust Doctrine, 14 U.C. DAvis L. REv. (Winter 1980); The Trust
Doctrine and the CaliforniaCoastline, 6 URBAN LAWYER 519 (1974).
91. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521, (1980); 606 P.2d 362

(1980), 162 Cal. Rptr. 327.
92. Id. at 521.
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common law.93 Under the English version of the public trust doctrine,
the state is given the task of holding equitable title to these public trust
lands. This is so even though legal title may have been conveyed to
private owners. The only exception to this trustee duty to retain the
equitable title occurs when a transfer of trust lands to private owners is
made to enhance the general purposes of the trust.
That a version of the public trust doctrine is also a part of California's
jurisprudence is not seriously contested. On numerous occasions the California Supreme Court has held that public trust lands became vested in
the state of California by virtue of its sovereignty.94 The scope of the
public trust doctrine, balancing private versus public rights, remains an
issue of some controversy. A survey of the history of California's version
of the public trust doctrine will demonstrate how the California Supreme
Court has created that version.
FederalBeginnings
In 1842 the United States Supreme Court held, in Martin v. Waddell,95
that the residents of each sovereign state had an "absolute right" to all
"navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use. "96
In 1876, in Barney v. Keokuk,9 7 the United States Supreme Court said
that each state may resolve its citizen's property disputes over lands lying
in the shorezones of navigable waters. As recently as 1977, the Court
reaffirmed that federal law only serves to fix the initial boundary between
federal and private property interests; state law decides those interests in
lands between high and low water.98
The California Supreme Court has relied heavily on the United States
Supreme Court ruling in Illinois CentralRailroad Co. v. Illinois,99 as the
foundation for several recent public trust case decisions. The majority of
the California court have claimed that Illinois Centralsets out as federal
law the principle that a state does not have the power to give up its role
as public trustee in favor of private parties."0 But Illinois Centraland its
claim that federal common law applies to the public trust doctrine has
93. Id.
94. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 521 (1980); 606 P.2d 362 (1980),
162 Cal. Rptr. 327; City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 482 (1970); People v. Kerber,
152 Cal. 731, 733 (1908); Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365, 372 (1867).

95. 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
96. Id. at 410.

97. 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
98. See State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1977).
99. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The Illinois Centralcase involved a grant, in fee simple, of the Chicago
waterfront by the Illinois legislature to the Illinois Central Railroad Company. A later session of the
legislature attempted to revoke this grant, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this revocation on
the basis that the initial grant violated the public trust doctrine.
100. See City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 521.
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been severely challenged. '' Perhaps the California Supreme Court places
such reliance on a single, highly suspect, federal decision because the
court's majority claims that Illinois Centraldoes in fact create a federal
common law public trust doctrine. Or, perhaps, the court needs some
official support for its version of the proper balance of public versus
private uses of natural resources. 0 2
California'sAdoption of the Doctrine
When California was admitted to statehood in 1850, it succeeded to
title in the tidelands as trustee for the public.' 3 Almost immediately, the
legislature began transferring away those trust lands to private owners.
No explicit reservation of any public trust interest was added to these
conveyances. By 1878, state -policy began to change. Delegates to the
1878 California Constitutional Convention enacted into law certain constitutional provisions that forbade the transfer of tidelands except under
certain limited conditions. " By 1909, the California legislature was ready
to ban all sales of the tidelands.0 5
As early as 1867, the California Supreme Court began taking a similar
path when it acknowledged the existence of a common law public trust
doctrine. 10 6 This judicial rule of law applied only to lands underneath
101. See Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CAL. L.
REv. 1138, 1141 (1982).
102. The California Supreme Court has called Illinois Central "the seminal case on the scope of
the public trust doctrine." City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 521; 172 Cal. Rptr. at 706. Justice Clark
in his dissent on Lyon, however, duly noted that Illinois Central did not impose any public trust
burden on shorezone property:
In concluding that the trust doctrine must extend to the shorezone the majority rely
mainly upon Illinois CentralRailroadv. Illinois ... where the Supreme Court held
that a grant of submergedlands in Lake Michigan was subject to the trust ....
The
court expressly recognized that it did not impose a trust on the shorezone.
172 Cal. Rptr. at 713. This interpretation seems contradictory to the statement made in City of
Berkeley that the grant of land included both submerged lands and tidelands. Assuming Justice Clark
is correct, the premise that Illinois Central is directly relevant to the present decisions is strained.
Far from serving as authority to extend the trust to freshwater shorezones, Illinois Centralholds that
only navigable submerged lands are burdened by the trust.
103. City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 521 (1980).
104. Cal. Const. Art. X, §§ 3-4, banned transfers of tidelands within two miles of a city or town,
and guaranteed public access to navigable waters.
105. Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 7991 (West 1977).
106. Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 365 (1867). Referring to the soil under navigable waters, the
court in Ward said:
Such land is held by the state in trust and for the benefit of the people. The right
of the state is subservient to the public rights of navigation and fishery, and theoretically, at least, the state can make no disposition of them prejudicial to the right
of the public to use them for the purposes of navigation and fishery, and whatever
disposition she does make of them her grantee takes them upon the same terms upon
which she holds them, and, of course, subject to the public rights above mentioned.
Id. at 372.
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navigable waters, at least as first applied. While this 1867 decision was
significant, the real landmark public trust case in California was not
decided until 1913. In People v. CaliforniaFish Co., 7 the California
Supreme Court said that all tidelands conveyed before the legislature's
total ban in 1909 were still subject to a public trust interest. In this manner,
the court sanctioned taking back that which many believed had been given
away. The court has been expanding the scope of this public trust reservation in the seventy years since CaliforniaFish.
The most dramatic expansion in public trust uses has occurred in the
last ten to fifteen years.' Where the ancient Roman, English, and original
California trust doctrines protected navigation and fishing, the present
version of California's doctrine also protects the public's use of trust
lands for recreation and conservation.
The recent movement began with the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney." 9
In Marks, the California Supreme Court said, "the public uses to which
tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public
needs.'. The Marks court took this occasion to declare that one of the
most important uses of the trust tidelands was the preservation of these
lands in their natural state. With preservation, these lands could serve as
"ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."''. This decision
meant a lot to the people of California, especially those who could not
afford land of their own.
Again in 1980, in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court,"2 the California
Supreme Court admitted that the earlier public trust doctrine cases limited
the public uses to navigation and fishing, but now it held that the permissible range of public uses is broader. It includes the right to hunt,
bathe, swim, and the right to preserve tidelands in their natural state." 3
To those uses, recreational boating has been added recently," 4 and the
list promises to grow. Yet, there have been some restraints placed on the
state's trustee powers. In the 1970 case of City of Long Beach v. Mansell,' the California Supreme Court said that the state is estopped from
raising the public trust doctrine when the chance for harm to a private
land owner outweighs the potential harm to the public's interest in trust107. 166 Cal. 576 (1913).
108. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251; 98 Cal. Rptr. 790; 491 P.2d 374 (1971).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 259.
111. Id.
112. 26 Cal. 3d 515 (1980).
113. Id. at 521.
114. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 55 Cal. App. 3d 560; 127 Cal. Rptr.
830 (1st Dist. 1976).
115. 3 Cal. 3d 462; 476 P.2d 423; 91 Cal. Rptr. 23.
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lands. " 6 So a balancing test must be applied. First, the court must consider
the potential harm to private owners that may be caused by imposing the
trust. Against this, the court must balance the extent to which the trust
furthers the goals of environmental protection." 7 Another restraint on the
doctrine involves the kinds of resources included. The California Supreme
Court, along with the vast majority of other courts, had limited the
doctrine to tidelands. But in 1981, in a pair of companion decisions, the
California court took away this restraint.
The Doctrine Evolving: From Tidelands to Navigable Waters
The California Supreme Court's companion rulings in State of California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 8 and State of California v. Superior
Court (Fogerty),"' applied the public trust to a different kind of resource.
Lyon held that the "shorezones" of nontidal, navigable waters-lakes
and rivers-would now be subject to the public trust reservation. Fogerty
added that the state's century-old failure to claim any such interest in
nontidal shorezones would not estop it from claiming them in the future.
This ruling was contrary to the court's Mansell decision of only ten years
earlier. In his dissent in Lyon, Justice William Clark noted the practical
import of the majority's holding, saying it cast clouds on thousands of
land titles and uses. He said homes and farms, uses he felt were far more
valuable to20California citizens than trust uses, were now placed in severe
jeopardy. 1
Justice Stanley Mosk, author of the majority opinions in both Lyon
and Fogerty, freely admitted that the English common law version of the
doctrine had never been applied to nontidal lands. He drew an important
distinction between England and California. Common law England held
that only the "beds" of lands lying underneathtidal waters were burdened
by the trust. But in England there are no important nontidal navigable
waters; tidal waters came to mean public waters, and nontidal waters
came to mean private waters.' Justice Mosk rejected the claim that
116. Id.
117. See, Note, supra note 101, at 1151.
118. 29 Cal. 3d 210; 625 P.2d 239; 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981).
119. 29 Cal. 2d 240; 625 P.2d 256; 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981).
120. Justice Clark did not say that the approved trust uses are unimportant. He argued that the
state has, and still is, providing for such uses. He said "Application of the trust to millions of acres
historically and presently within the shorezone is overkill, contrary to public policy, and an inequitable
infringement on long-settled and vested titles." 172 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
121. Lyon, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 700. The nature of navigable waters in the United States and England
is obviously very different. As a consequence, the English version of the public trust doctrine was
not thought to be appropriate for states containing numerous inland rivers and lakes. These important
inland waterways were navigable in fact, even though they were not always subject to the ebb and
flow of the tides. In an 1851 U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court held that the federal government
had admiralty jurisdiction in rivers and lakes that were navigable in fact, whether or not they were
subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. See Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 U.S. 443, 455

(1851).
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California adopted the English version of the trust doctrine when it was
granted statehood. Ignoring a contradictory statutory provision passed by
the 1850 legislature, Mosk said: "the concept that only common law
doctrine applicable to local conditions has been incorporated into our law
is as old as the state itself. 1 22 Justice Mosk concluded that there is no
logical reason to restrict public rights to tidelands.
It is significant that California now applies the trust to nontidal waters,
and also quite defensible, given the number of important nontidal waters
in that state. It makes sense to apply the doctrine to the beds lying
underneath both tidal and nontidal waters, but should this extension include the strip of shorezone property as well? Several other states have
considered the same question of whether the shorezones are included in
the trust, and they have given different answers.'" A few states do claim
122. 172 Cal. Rptr. at 702, n.7. In his dissent Justice Clark tried to show that the use of the
public trust is inappropriate for nontidal lands simply because they are not covered by the ebb and
flow of daily tidewaters. Clark said:
Unlike tidelands the instant shorezone is uncovered for long periods of time, often
the better part of a year. Tidelands, unlike the instant lands, are covered and uncovered twice each day by salt water which, unlike the waters of Clear Lake, severely
limits use of underlying lands for agricultural purposes.
Id. at 710.
Clark pointed out that daily flooding by saltwater would severely limit the use of these underlying
lands for agricultural purposes. His reason for noting this dissimilarity (between lands that are
covered on a daily basis by tidewaters and lands in the shorezone that are exposed for long periods
of time) was probably to show the difference in economic value between shorezone lands and
tidelands. Because the shorezone is much more valuable for agricultural and residential purposes,
Clark seems to believe that the public trust doctrine should not be applied to this resource. However,
even Justice Clark believes that: "while the lands may be extremely valuable for agricultural and
residential purposes, a balancing of values is not the test under the trust doctrine. The test is lack
of value for trust purposes." Id. at'712. In Clark's view, the only question that would seem to be
relevant to the scope of the public trust would be whether these shorezone lands have "value" for
trust purposes.
123. The Lyon court stated that approximately twenty states have adopted a low water line for
their navigable waters. A few allow private ownership to the middle of the body of water. Ten
jurisdictions have adopted California's approach of claiming ownership to the high water mark. 172
Cal. Rptr. at 699, n. 4. The states seem to agree on only one thing: that the rights of the parties
claiming ownership will depend upon which portion of the underlying bed of land is being discussed.
See Annot.: Right of Public in Shore of Inland Navigable Lake Between High- and Low- Water
Marks. 40 A.L.R. 3d 776 (1971). As this title indicates, this Annotation discusses the cases that
consider whether the public has a right to the shorezone. Although there have been relatively few
cases that have dealt with this subject, there is apparently little agreement about the public's rights
to this strip of land. The concerns of the courts seemed to focus on the intensification of encroachment
by commercially-motivated shorezone landowners:
The concern voiced by the court suggests that counsel representing the public would
do well to point out the implications, in terms of the public interest, of overdevelopment by the littoral owner of the shore, and the need particularly to protect the
public's right to enjoyment of all the water of a navigable inland lake, including
water up to the high-water mark when the lake is at its highest level.
40 A.L.R. 3d 776, 780.
In sum, the rights of the people against private owners have depended upon whether the land in
question was permanently submerged under navigable waters, or was that strip of land referred to
as the shorezone or tidezone.
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sovereign ownership of shorezone lands; the vast majority do not. Justice
Mosk says that because federal law gives California the option of claiming
this resource, it is California's public policy to make this claim.' 4
Another important aspect of the Lyon and Fogerty holdings is that
reclaimed lands are now included within the protection of the trust. In
his vigorous dissents, Justice Clark expresses grave concern about the
future use of reclaimed lands in California, lands being productively used
for farms and homes."z He says that "the legislature has never found or
determined such reclaimed lands (to be) useless for trust purposes or free
of the trust." 2 6 Because the reclamation of tidelands does not necessarily
124. See, Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977); Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876).
Justice Mosk rejected the theory that the legislature granted the shorezone lands to private owners
by enactment of Civil Code Section 830 in 1872. See generally,CaliforniaCivil Code Section 830;
A Rule of PropertyNeededfor the Protection of the PrivateLandowner, 9 PAc. L. J. 1011 (1978).
Mosk said the interpretation of whether § 830 constituted a grant of land or a mere rule of construction
for deeds was ambiguous. Despite the ambiguity, Mosk conceded that a private owner should share
ownership of the shorezone resource down to the low water mark. Although Justice Mosk said "the
decisional law is ambiguous regarding whether § 830 constitutes a grant or a rule for the construction
of deeds," he admits the same thing cannot be said of the "administrative interpretation" of § 830.
172 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
With few exceptions the evidence strongly favored the position of the private landowners that the
state claimed ownership only to the low water mark until at least 1970. In 1970 the attorney general
reexamined this position, and reversed his opinion. The attorney general asserted that the state
"owned the land under navigable lakes and streams to high water." Id. at 704. While the majority
held that it would not be bound by the pre-1970 administrative construction of this section, it said
that it could not ignore "long-continued and frequently expressed views to the effect that § 830
constitutes a grant to private persons of title to the beds of navigable, nontidal bodies to low water
mark." Id. at 705. The court said further: "It cannot be said that the statute is so clear and unambiguous
that these expressions (of the attorney general) may be disregarded." Id. Justice Mosk reviewed two
similar statutes applying to other jurisdictions (Montana and North Dakota) and said those states
also interpreted their statutes as conveying title to riparian owners to the low water mark.
At the same time Mosk said this grant of title to private riparian landowners by § 830 was not
free of the trust burden. Instead, grantees would take subject to the superior rights of the public.
The majority cited the case of People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913), which
held:
[a] statute authorizing the conveyance of tidelands will not be interpreted to abandon
the public trust unless no other interpretation is reasonably possible. Nothing in the
language of § 830 requires a conclusion that riparian landholders take free of the
public's rights in the lands between low and high water in navigable lakes and
streams.
172 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
Mosk found comfort for private landowners in the fact that they would not be deprived of use of
the shorezone as long as their uses were not incompatible with the public's superior interest. It is
Justice Clark's view that there would be substantial deprivation of residential, agricultural, and
governmental uses of the shorezones as a result of imposing the public trust to these resources.
125. Justice Clark said: "Such reclaimed lands have become some of the world's most productive
farmland. Other large areas of reclaimed land have been used for urban development. For example,
much of Sacramento is built upon reclaimed land." 172 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
126. Id. These agricultural and residential uses, while not necessarily inconsistent with the trust,
are also not expressly included as allowable uses. See id. at 711 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Marks
v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 2d 251, 261-62 (1971)). The mere process of reclaiming tidelands, either
permanently or periodically, does not necessarily end the public trust burden. This fact was settled
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destroy the public trust, millions of homes and farms could theoretically
be declared illegal uses.127
The fact that people have used these lands for farms and homes in
good faith for years would not matter. In Fogerty the respondent argued
that even if a public trust did apply to private lakeshore and riverside
property, the state should be equitably estopped from claiming public
trust rights to those lands. After duly noting the respondent's precedent
of Mansell, the Fogerty majority denied the respondent's claim of equitable estoppel. The majority said one critical requirement for applying
the equitable estoppel theory, a requirement never mentioned in the Mansell case, was absent: "Estoppel will not be applied to the government
if the result would be to nullify a strong rule of policy adopted for the
benefit of the public."' 2 8 Based on a "strong rule of public policy" in
preserving the shorezone, the majority refused to weigh the interests of
the private owners, as required by Mansell. The Fogerty court denied the
claims of estoppel saying the state's policy of resource preservation takes
precedence.
Justice Clark, in Fogerty, said the majority's interpretation of Mansell
was both arbitrary and wrong. He said the thousands of affected homeby the California Supreme Court in Marks, id. at 261. The legislature in theory may have the power
to free specific parcels of land from the public trust burden, but any statute attempting to end the
burden will be carefully scrutinized by the courts to find if there was a specific legislative intent to
end the public's trust use. See, id. at 260. See also, City of Berkeley, 26 Cal. 3d at 525.
There is some doubt whether the California Supreme Court really intends to include reclaimed
lands within the scope of the trust. In City of Berkeley the court held that landowners who relied
upon official approval to reclaim tidelands would not have their lands burdened by the public trust.
(See 26 Cal. 3d at 535, n. 19, where the court distinguished this case from Marks.) But the private
tideland owners in City of Berkeley based their claims on specific statutes not applicable to the
present facts. The particular statute involved in the City of Berkeley case was an act passed in 1870
that conveyed title to the purchasers of tidelands in San Francisco Bay, free of the public trust.
While the court overturned prior cases that had held that these grants were in fee simple and not
subject to any public rights, it also concluded that "tracts of land granted by the board that have
been improved or filled are... free of the public trust." 26 Cal. 3d at 519.
The City of Berkeley court said it had two options in dealing with the lands that had been conveyed
pursuant to the 1870 Act. It could declare all grants made under the Act subject to the public trust,
or it could hold that the decision would be prospective only. The court rejected both of these options,
choosing instead an intermediate course. The court believed it had to balance the interests of the
public with those of the private grantees and their successors;
In keeping with this principle, we hold that submerged lands as well as lands subject
to tidal action that were conveyed by board deeds under the 1870 Act are subject
to the public trust. Properties that have been filled, whether or not they have been
substantially improved, are free of the trust to the extent the areas of such parcels
are not subject to tidal action.
Id. at 534. Addressing the question raised by the defendants, the City of Berkeley court said that it
would not include reclaimed but unimproved land in bay frontage because it believed the balancing
of interests would require only the tidal portions of the parcels of land should be made subject to
the trust. This approach of the majority seems inconsistent with the view expressed by Justice Clark
that applying the public trust burden only requires that there be a finding that lands have "value."
Id. at 535.
127. Lyon, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
128. Fogerty, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
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owners in the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys, and the similarly
affected farmers, would suffer great injustices that would clearly outweigh
the loss to the public trust. 29
The most recent use of the public trust doctrine firmly establishes the
new importance of this rule of resource preservation. In the 1983 case
3 litigation was brought
of NationalAudubon Society v. Superior Court,"'
by National Audubon to enjoin the California Division of Water Resources
from diverting the water of four freshwater rivers from Mono Lake near
Yosemite National Park. Relying on Lyon andFogerty, National Audubon
argued that the public trust doctrine applies to the shores, beds, and waters
of Mono Lake. National Audubon was concerned that the water level of
the lake, which has been dropping ever since these diversions first began,
threatened the breeding colony of California gulls.
The NationalAudubon case is unique because the California Supreme
Court was asked to choose between two competing legal doctrines in
order to resolve the litigation. The court had to face the issue of the
correct relationship between California's water rights law and its evolving
public trust doctrine. The court's solution was to fit the two doctrines
into one comprehensive scheme. In the Mono Lake situation, it held that
river waters feeding the lake may be diverted even though it harmed
public trust uses. But official approval of such river water diversion could
not occur without first considering public trust uses which must be preserved whenever feasible.
Although the California court stated that it was merely fitting the two
conflicting legal doctrines into one composite system, the National Audubon decision means more to California citizens than the court admits.
The new, dramatically evolving version of the public trust doctrine is
becoming a co-equal partner with the complex water rights system that
is the lifeblood of California agriculture. The relevant administrative
agencies must now take into account the public trust uses of recreation
and preservation when making water allocation decisions.
NationalAudubon reflects the changing priorities of a state facing a
future of enormous population burdens. This decision signals important
changes in the public policy of California that may have a profound effect
on the behavior of its residents for years to come.
APPLYING SOCIOBIOLOGY TO THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
What Sociobiology Has to Offer
By applying the sociobiology paradigm to the public trust doctrine, a
narrow and specialized legal theory may be viewed with an entirely new
129. See 172 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
130. 33 Cal. 3d 419; 189 Cal. Rptr. 346; 658 P.2d 709 (1983).
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point of view. What sociobiology offers is nothing short of a system of
evolutionary ethics, a value system based on our knowledge of human
evolution. Imagine what this means. It means that science offers us a
system of ethics where evolutionary knowledge can be used to interpret
moral results.' If human behavior can be predicted from knowledge of
evolutionary theory, a standard could be developed by which to judge
individual conduct and the laws that are designed to regulate such conduct.
In a sense, the evolutionary "morality" of our laws could be pre-judged.
Two factors in our modem lives make it urgent that society turn, and
quickly, to a system of evolutionary ethics and evolutionary law. First,
as population booms and technology becomes more complex, we must
face a world of greatly accelerated change. Second, not only do we have
a greatly accelerated rate of change to worry about, the effects of change
are being magnified as well. Because we live in a densely populated,
technologically complex society, any actions we take have heightened
human consequences. 132
Theorize that morality is the result of our genetic inheritance.' 3 3 From
deep within our brains come the impulses for our ethical behavior, our
system of values, and, ultimately, our laws. By tracing back through
evolutionary history, we can study and judge the relative worth of our
rules of behavior.'34 Some human drives are genetically determined; we
35
have biological rights which no system of ethics or laws can destroy.'
See generally, Quinton, Ethics and the Theory of Evolution, in BIOLOGY AND PERSONALrrY
(Ramsey ed. 1966).
Id. at 129.
Wilson argued that:
[I]nnate censors and motivators exist in the brain that deeply and unconsciously
affect our ethical premises; from these roots, morality evolved as instinct....
Science may soon be in a position to investigate the very origin and meaning of
human values, from which all ethical pronouncements and much of political practice
flow. Philosophers themselves, most of whom lack an evolutionary perspective,
have not devoted much time to the problem. They examine the precepts of ethical
systems with reference to their consequences and not their origins.
NATURE, supranote 1, at 5.
134. Wilson says:
Human emotional responses and the more general ethical practices based on them
have been programmed to a substantial degree by natural selection over thousands
of generations. The challenge to science is to measure the tightness of the constraints
caused by the programming, to find their source in the brain, and to decode their
significance through the reconstruction of the evolutionary history of the mind. This
enterprise will be the logical complement of the continued study of cultural evolution.
Id. at 6.
135. See Mattern, Altruism, Ethics, and Sociobiology, in THE SOCIOBIOLOGy DEBATE, supra note
13, at 469. Wilson sums up his claims for sociobiology as follows:
The core of scientific materialism is the evolutionary epic. Let me repeat its minimum
claims: that the laws of the physical sciences are consistent with those of the
biological and social sciences and can be linked in chains of causal explanation;
that life and mind have a physical basis; that the world as we know it has evolved
from earlier worlds obedient to the same laws; and that the visible universe today
131.
107-30
132.
133.
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Some call these views a revival of the Spencerian evolutionary positivism updated with modem genetics.' 36 This philosophy says that what
evolves must serve some adaptive function, or it will eventually be eliminated as maladaptive. By using evolutionary human behavior as our
standard of moral rights, an enforced law and moral standard, such as
the public trust doctrine, takes on new significance. The issue now is
whether California's version of the trust doctrine is adaptive or maladaptive. Is it suited for the biology of human nature, is this legal imperative a positive step in our evolutionary path, or is it doomed to a
short-lived existence? These are questions our courts might ask themselves
before subjecting the public to changes in existing law.
Certain hurdles still must be overcome if we are to make effective use
of sociobiology to evaluate our laws. One problem to overcome is how
to equate the great differences in time frames between biological and
' What relevance could the biology of human behavior
cultural evolution. 37
have for the rapid cultural evolution of law? One thing we can be certain
of is that both cultural and biological evolution need to respond to changing environmental conditions.
The California Supreme Court has apparently realized this need to
adapt to changing conditions. For example, one of the reasons the court
gave for applying the public trust doctrine to nontidal waters, when
English common law did not, was that there were no important nontidal,
navigable waters in England. The California court said that England's
test of "navigability" as a legal rule was framed "with special reference
to the physical condition of a country differing widely from our own. '
Different legal rules are needed for different environments.
The public trust doctrine, like any legal rule, evolves culturally to
satisfy the environmental selection pressures it faces. But as we saw in
our discussion of the coevolutionary theory of human behavior, the biological aspect of human nature cannot be ignored. Cultural innovations
must pay heed to human biological drives if those innovations are to be
truly adaptive.
Despite the arguments of cultural determinists, the evidence is strong;
humans are not simply blank slates subject to whatever cultural influences
is everywhere subject to these materialist explanations. The epic can be indefinitely
strengthened up and down the line, but its most sweeping assertions cannot be
proved with finality. What I am suggesting, in the end, is that the evolutionary epic
is probably the best myth we will ever have. It can be adjusted until it comes as
close to truth as the human mind is constructed to judge the truth.
NATURE, supra note 1,at 201.
136. Miller, Fated Genes, in J. HIsT. BEHAVIORAL SOL 186 (April 1976).
137. The evolution of law is chiefly a cultural phenomenon, even laws with roots as deep as
ancient Rome. Man is the same biologically as he was during the Ice Age; culture is only a few
thousand years old.
138. Lyon, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 701-02.
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may come their way. In fact, the ability to absorb culture is itself a
biological inheritance. This biological capacity to evolve culturally, however, has limits. Man is not infinitely plastic. Even though humans may
achieve more adaptive social structures than other animal species, the
process of cultural/social evolution is the same for all.' 39 Cultural and
biological structures face the same process of natural selection. Aspects
of each must face selection pressures, and only the most adaptive forms
will survive.
The biological process is easy to see; often the illfitting organism will
die out, leaving no offspring. But how are we to judge the success of
cultural forms? Cultural forms such as legal doctrine do not have lives
of their own, yet they do have an impact on their environments, just as
superior biological organisms crowd out less adapted organisms. Probably
the best way to measure the success of our cultural norms is to observe
the extent to which the norms survive, inspire similar and complementary
forms, replace other forms, and bring about the advancement of human
needs. 140
Where can we get evidence that a sorting process occurs within our
legal system and that the California version of the trust doctrine will be
a successful, adaptive form? We can look for signs that our courts know
that a coevolutionary process of biological and cultural evolution applies
to the law, and look at what courts say when they create law. If they are
aware of the biology of human nature, these insights likely would find
their way into the courts' written opinions. If these insights are not expressed, there is another possible source of evidence. We can look to see
what impact the legal rules have, or may have, on our cultural environment. Because judges do not operate in a vacuum, it is reasonable to
assume they know the consequences of their rulings on human behavior.
Of course, if we fail to turn up any evidence at all, this will tell us that
the legal rule is probably maladaptive and doomed for eventual extinction.
By applying the paradigm of sociobiology to legal doctrine, we have a
chance to evaluate these rules. We have a standard, a social norm, by
which to measure their fitness for our increasingly complex society.
We can begin by looking for direct evidence that our courts are aware
of the biological aspect of human behavior, for language in the California
public trust cases showing an appreciation for human nature. Does the
court acknowledge the concept of territoriality, the biological need to
protect a culturally defined piece of property, and does the court say it
understands how to correctly focus the impulses of tribal altruism?
139. See, Emlen, An Alternative Casefor Sociobiology, ScIENcE, May 21, 1976, at 736-38.
140. Durham, Towarda CoevolutionaryTheory ofHuman Biology and Culture,in THE SoIOBIoGY
DEBATE, supra note 13, at 433.
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Application of the SociobiologicalModel
A curious fact comes out of a reading of the recent California public
trust cases: the paucity of concern for individual property rights. The
court's recent decisions are contrary to the historical public policy of
California. Imposing a public trust burden on freshwater shorezones would
have seriously stifled the reclamation of millions of acres of land. If this
public trust doctrine had always been the law of California, development
of those lands would have been made very difficult; countless residential,
agricultural, and governmental uses would never have been allowed.
The California Supreme Court has expressed its great concern for the
proper use of the state's natural resources, but it is a concern about public,
not private, ownership interests. For example, in Lyon the majority of
the court expressed its concern about the future of shorezone lands saying
that lands of this type "constitute a resource which is fast disappearing
in California; they are of great importance for the
ecology, and for the
14
recreational needs of the residents of the state.' '
The public trust doctrine itself, at least the California version of it,
may be characterized as a legal concept diametrically opposed to the
concept of individual property use. The effect of applying the doctrine
is to restrict such uses as farms and homes. In Justice Clark's view, the
California court has "blinded" itself to 130 years of California land law.
He said this historical development of pre-public trust doctrine land law
"recognizes what highly productive members of our society undertook
to forge, not only to serve their needs but also to serve the needs of
society." 42 What the recent public trust cases do is make impossible that
kind of land development in the future, the court choosing instead to
protect the public's assumed preservation interest in these resources. The
preservation use is largely incompatible with the historical uses granted
to private landowners. The preservation use fails to acknowledge the
sanctity and defensibility of private land titles. Thus, the biological need
for territory and its free use seems to be the furthest thing from the
California Supreme Court's collective mind.
With the need to protect territory ignored, is the genetically influenced
human trait for altruistic behavior found in the language of the cases and,
if it is, is the majority sensitive to the "tribal" limits of such altruistic
leanings? 43 Certainly the sacrifices required by the public trust doctrine
141. Lyon, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
142. Id. at 713.
143. The type of altruism being discussed here is known as reciprocal altruism, the trading of
altruistic acts by individuals at different times. For example, one person saves a drowning person
in exchange for the promise, or at least with the expectation, that the altruistic act will be repaid if
the circumstances are reversed at sometime in the future. SOCIOBIOLoGy, supra note 2, at 593. There
is another form of altruism known as "kin-selection," the sacrifice of one for a genetic relative.
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involve a type of mandated rescue, a loss of private property uses to
benefit an unknown public. In essence, the public trust doctrine could be
labeled a "share the wealth" scheme. The California Supreme Court thus
far has ignored any and all claims that the doctrine acts as an unconstitutional taking of property, using the justification that the public trust
limitations on land titles have always existed. The court said that property
holders taking title of state trust lands took them subject to those superior
public trust uses. This line of reasoning suggests that the court honestly
believes land owners are not really being forced to be altruistic because
they are not giving up anything they already own. But assuming that the
effect of the doctrine is to require them to give up the right of exclusive,
unrestricted property use, we can at least say this legal rule is an example
of a socially imposed form of reciprocal altruism.
All scenarios involving inherited notions of reciprocal altruism involve
the formula of small cost to the provider and great benefit to the recipient. " Does the California approach to the public trust doctrine fit this
reciprocal altruism model? The court has taken pains to show the benefits
side of the doctrine. There is little doubt that the recent decisions have
condemned the negative impact of shorezone overdevelopment. These
negative impacts are what the new version of the public trust doctrine
seeks to correct. The stakes to the public are admittedly high, and the
court has never failed to stress this fact in its most recent written opinions. 45
'
On the other side of the formula, however, there is a problem. The
recent decisions state that no great loss is being imposed on private
property owners other than their destroyed hopes for future development.
The court said that even if property use is being restricted, property owners
may still use the trust lands for purposes compatible with the trust. t"
Thus there is a missing factor in our attempt to apply the reciprocal
altruism formula. Reciprocal altruism requires that one who sacrifices for
others must receive something in return: altruism must be truly "reciprocal." What present or future benefit can California's burdened property
owners reasonably anticipate? Beyond the protection being given them
as members of the general public, nothing is being offered back to the
144. Robert Trivers has argued that the conditions that influence whether reciprocal altruistic
behavior will be selected for include such things as length of the individual's lifetime, degrees of
mutual dependence, and lack of a dominance hierarchy. See generally, Trivers, The Evolution of
ReciprocalAltruism, in 46 Q. REv. BIoLoGY 35-39, 45-47 (March 1971).
145. The majority opinion in Fogerty detailed the significance of these dwindling resources to
Californians, projecting losses that could lead to the rapid elimination of all riparian vegetation. 172
Cal Rptr. at 716. As the majority noted, "the shorezone is a fragile and complex resource." Id.
146. Fogert); 172 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The court noted that previously constructed decks, piers,
etc. can be used unless inconsistent with the trust, and compensation for improvements already made
must be given if they are taken to preserve the trust.
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property owners for their sacrifice in the name of this conservationist
legal doctrine. Indeed, the California court seems content to justify the
public trust as "an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands, and tidelands."' 4 7 All of the court's recent decisions speak only to the benefits
to the general public, not to the reciprocal benefits a property owner might
expect. For example, in Fogerty the majority stressed the value that
preserving "gene pool" diversity had for the general public. 4' 8 No mention
of the value of the doctrine to affected property owners is made; it simply
is not a concern of the California Supreme Court.
Arguably, then, the cases do not add up to any awareness of the human
behavior pattern of reciprocal altruism. Sacrifice is being called for, but
no payoff is being given in return. If we are to find evidence of the court's
awareness of human nature, of the instincts of territoriality and altruism,
it is not going to be found in the plain language of the cases.
As a result of the new public trust doctrine, a complete reevaluation
and limitation on previous ownership interests has occurred. The court,
in both language and deed, has ignored that aspect of human behavior
that needs to protect territory from unknown intruders. Other than promising compensation for the destruction of property taken for trust uses,
the California Supreme Court does not seem concerned about this part
of human behavior.
Perhaps the court deliberately does not intend its public trust doctrine
to be a balanced representation of human nature. The California version
may simply be intended as a demonstration of the altruistic side of human
nature. This may be the court's way of forcing the altruistic instinct into
our system of laws, a system that before may have stressed only the need
for territory. The public trust doctrine seen in this manner may simply
be the court's way of overcoming a legally sanctioned imbalance in favor
of the territorial drive.
Hints of this view are found in the NationalAuduboncase. The central
issue involved there was the relationship of California's water rights law
with the public trust doctrine. As noted earlier, this litigation was inspired
by the threat that receding water levels in Mono Lake made to a large
breeding colony of California gulls. The California Supreme Court said
that a balancing of needs must be made by the agencies involved, with
the public trust uses being preserved whenever possible. While the court
believed that its holding merely brought together two competing legal
147. NationalAudubon, 658 P.2d at 724.
148. In Fogerty, the majority noted that "the shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It
provides the environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish .. . .birds . ...
and many other species of wildlife and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study,
since they provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity." 172 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
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doctrines into one complete system, the significance of its holding is not
that modest. NationalAudubon raises the public trust doctrine to a new
level of importance by making it a co-equal partner with the very elaborate
and highly complex system of water rights.
From now on, the administrative agencies charged with resolving water
rights issues have a new mandate. They must account for any public trust
abuses resulting from their water allocation decisions. The public trust
doctrine is to be used to offset the water rights allocation system, a system
that has focused mainly on individual property rights. Perhaps the California court intends to use the public trust doctrine as a type of legally
imposed altruism, a balance to the territorial needs satisfied by the existing
water rights allocation system. What has caused this sudden desire to
shift emphasis from the overt protection of territory to an equal balance
of biological needs? What change in the social, cultural, and physical
environment makes it necessary for the law to seek a more adaptive fit?
The answer may be the court's recognition that the "carrying capacity' 49
of California's shorezones is being pushed to their present limits. Most
animal species evolve some sort of population limiting mechanism to
avoid overloading the carrying capacity of their habitats. Because of
man's seemingly infinite technical ability to improve the carrying capacity
of his environment, however, the need for human self-limiting mechanisms has not been obvious. Our culturally evolved skills of resource
development and management have let us keep ahead of the demands of
our booming population.' 50
Perhaps the court now foresees an end to that ability to stay one step
ahead of catastrophe. California's use of the public trust doctrine as a
preservationist tool may simply be our long overdue population-limiting
mechanism. This stress on preservation is most clearly stated by the court
majority in the Lyon and Fogerty cases. The majority and the dissent
want to protect entirely different groups of people. While Justice Clark
seeks to aid the territorial needs of individual farmers and homeowners,
the majority is more interested in sacrificing individual property rights
for the benefit of the general public.
Which view best represents the most adaptive fit for the legal environment in California? The prevailing majority seems to believe that
freeing up these rapidly dwindling resources for public use, at the expense
of private ownership, is the way to save them for all. Is this a realistic
goal? Can the beneficiaries of legally imposed altruism be members of a
149. Carrying capacity is defined as "the largest number of organisms of a particular species that
can be maintained indefinitely in a given part of the environment." SOCIOBIOLOGY, supra note 2, at
580.
150. See Wynne-Edwards, Intergroup Selection in the Evolution of Social Systems, 200 NATURE
623-24 (1963).
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group as large as the general public?... The mere fact that these recent
decisions show a dramatic, sudden change in the status quo does not
necessarily mean these new rules of conduct are more or less adaptive.
It may well be the time to move the borders of our altruistic loyalties.
The process of evolution expects never-ending variety, instability, and
(eventually) adaptive change, and the possibility that these changes are
merely temporary "mutations" doomed to failure.
Economist Kenneth Boulding has said that in a society without "empty
niches" there can be no development.' "A society that suppresses anything different from the present ... that thinks it knows all there is to
know will clearly be pretty stagnant.' 53 To Boulding the ideal result of
cultural and biological coevolution would be the creation of "islands" of
thought in occasional contact with each other. Through a process of
migration, of ideas as well as biological species, progress and adaptive
fitness could be achieved. It may be that this is the ultimate legacy of
California's radical aproach to the protection of its trust resources.
Whether the California Supreme Court's version of the common law
public trust doctrine equally balances the needs for territory and altruism
is not important. As long as the evolutionary process of change is given
free reign, the most adaptive rules for our cultural and physical environment must and will ultimately prevail. This is the real truth of natural
selection: the most adaptive fit will survive. But whether we have the
luxury of time for this legal evolution is uncertain.
It is also far from certain whether California's version of the doctrine
is the most adaptive fit. The California Supreme Court's idealistic protection of the global "tribe" at individual expense competes with our
biological evidence of the nature of human nature. Man's altruism, while
genetically inherited and culturally defined, is based on the concerns of
the local tribe. To impose a rule of law that forces sacrifices for the entire
public, when the need for such expanded loyalties is not clearly and
convincingly established, is contrary to the biology of human nature.
To ignore the findings of sociobiology, in a world of rapid, dramatic,
and far reaching change, may be a serious mistake. The consequences
of maladaptive change may have an impact far beyond man's ability to
cope. If man's sense of altruism is truly flexible enough to permit sacrifice
151. In City of Berkeley, the court discussed the special role of the "rule of property" in the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis. This doctrine relates to a settled rule that constitutes a
rule of property on which important rights are based. Despite the stare decisis that had to be overcome
to apply public trust theory, the majority believed that allowing erroneous decisions to stand that
would deprive the people of the state of full control over thousands of acres of tidelands would be
worse than disturbing the rule of property. 26 Cal. 3d at 533.
152. Boulding, Evolution of Riches, 91 Sci. DIG. 35 (June 1983).
153. Id.

466

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

in favor of the general public, the courts must still clearly show us the
need for these new loyalties. Nothing short of ecological disaster is likely
to persuade tribal man of the need to give up his protection of property
in favor of the general masses. Certainly the utopian belief that a shift
of cultural standards will accomplish this change will not convince him.

